Motion Picture Theaters (except Drive-Ins) — U.S. Industry Primer

NAICS 2022 code 512131. NAICS stands for the North American Industry Classification System, the standard the U.S. government uses to group businesses. This code covers indoor cinemas — the multiplexes and single-screen theaters that sell tickets to publicly exhibit motion pictures. Drive-in theaters sit in a separate code (512132).

---

1. Overview

A movie theater ("exhibitor," in industry terms) licenses films from studios, sells tickets to see them, and — critically — sells popcorn, soda, and increasingly full meals at very high markups. It is a venue-and-experience business, not simply a ticket-sales business: real-estate-heavy, fixed-cost, and dependent above all on one thing — the quality and volume of the films studios release each year.

Why it is worth understanding: this is a mature, consolidating, and structurally challenged industry that is also actively reinventing itself. U.S. cinemas sold roughly 780 million tickets in 2025, down about 5% from 2024 and down nearly 37% from the 1.24 billion sold in 2019, before the COVID-19 pandemic.[21] Domestic box office came in around $8.8–8.9 billion in 2025, still more than 20% below the 2019 peak of about $11.4 billion.[21][6] Yet the business is not dying — it is shrinking its footprint while trying to earn more per visit through premium screens and food. That combination of decline, cyclicality, and reinvention is what makes it interesting to analyze.

The central question for any investor or operator is whether a business can turn a volatile film slate into reliable cash flow — through premium pricing, concessions, loyalty programs, alternative content, and disciplined control of leases and capital spending.

Ways in:

• Public-market participants can access theater operators, a premium-format technology licensor, the industry's largest landlord, and a cinema-advertising network (Section 4).
• Private participants range from private-equity owners of large chains, to a Hollywood studio that now owns a chain, down to individuals who buy and run a single small-town theater — a genuine small-business path in this fragmented industry.

---

2. What it is and how it's structured

Scope. NAICS 512131 covers establishments "primarily engaged in operating motion picture theaters (except drive-ins) and/or exhibiting motion pictures or videos."[4] That includes standard multiplexes, megaplexes, art-house and dine-in cinemas, cinema cafés, and film-festival exhibitors.

The exhibitor sits between the film distributor and the consumer:

Studios and distributors → theatrical license → exhibitor → tickets, food, advertising, and events

Theaters generally do not own the films they show. They license titles under agreements that tie film-rental expense to box-office performance, and they control the venue, the schedule, local marketing, the customer relationship, and — most profitably — the concessions.

What it excludes (naming the adjacent codes clarifies the boundaries):

• 512132 — Drive-In Motion Picture Theaters.
• 512120 — Motion Picture and Video Distribution (the studios/distributors that supply films to theaters).
• 512110 — Motion Picture and Video Production (the studios that make the films).
• 512191 / 512199 — Teleproduction, post-production, and other motion-picture services.
• 711110 — Theater Companies and Dinner Theaters (live theater), and other live-entertainment codes.

Streaming and home entertainment are competitors to this industry, not part of it. So NAICS 512131 is purely the exhibition link in the film value chain: production → distribution → exhibition → the audience.

Ownership mix. The top of the market is dominated by a handful of national chains ("circuits"); below them sits a long tail of regional chains, specialty exhibitors, nonprofit/foundation-backed operators, and independent theaters. Federal data confirm the concentration: the four largest firms account for 56% of industry receipts, the top eight for 62.3%, the top twenty for 70.9%, and the top fifty for 79%.[2] The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) — a standard concentration measure where higher means more concentrated — is 1,017, placing the industry at the low end of "moderately concentrated" by U.S. antitrust convention.[2] The gap between the establishment count and the firm count (below) confirms that multi-location operators are material.

---

3. How big it is

Our ground-truth federal figures for NAICS 512131:

The years differ because County Business Patterns (CBP) supplies the employment and payroll data, while the Economic Census supplies receipts and concentration data. Three things to read carefully:

Receipts are bigger than "box office." The $12.975 billion Census receipts figure for 2022 sits well above that year's domestic box office of roughly $7.4 billion, because Census counts the theater's entire revenue line — ticket sales plus concessions, on-screen advertising, event rentals, and premium upcharges.[2] "Box office" is only the ticket portion; the full industry P&L is materially larger, and the two should not be compared directly.

The establishment-vs-firm gap shows the chains. There are 4,057 sites but only 1,916 companies,[1][2] because the big circuits each run hundreds of locations — one firm, many establishments.

Undercount caveat. CBP covers employer establishments with paid employees; it excludes the self-employed, businesses without employees, and most government employees, and the Census Bureau notes possible undercoverage of very small multi-unit employers.[3] For this industry, though, the exposure is small: it is formal, brick-and-mortar, and concentrated, so federal business statistics capture it well. The main risk is missing tiny nonprofit, community, or nonemployer venues — not government-run ones. No suppressed values are used or estimated here.

For context beyond the federal snapshot, industry researchers count roughly 38,500–39,500 indoor screens across about 5,100–5,400 sites in 2025 — a net loss of some 3,000 screens and several hundred sites since 2019.[22] (Census defines "establishments" differently, hence the difference from the 4,057 figure.) The physical footprint is shrinking.

---

4. The investable universe

This is one of the few consumer industries with a small, clean roster of public plays. Figures below are from the most recent full-year filings (fiscal 2025 unless noted).

Public companies

Two adjacent public plays worth knowing:

• EPR Properties (EPR, NYSE) — a real-estate investment trust (REIT) that is the biggest single landlord to U.S. movie theaters; you own the buildings, not the operations. Its 2025 revenue included 13.6% from AMC and 11.5% from Regal, so tenant credit matters as much as attendance.[11]
• National CineMedia (NCMI) — the largest on-screen cinema-advertising network in the U.S.; it monetizes the pre-show, not the tickets.

Major private or non-listed owners

• Regal — the #2 U.S. chain, a subsidiary of UK-based Cineworld. Regal reported 394 theaters and 5,386 screens as of November 2025.[12] Cineworld/Regal went through Chapter 11 bankruptcy in 2022, emerged in mid-2023, and delisted; it is now controlled by its former creditors.[29]
• Alamo Drafthouse — the dine-in chain acquired by Sony Pictures Entertainment in 2024, the first time in decades a major Hollywood studio owned a theater circuit.[17]
• B&B Theatres — family-owned; company materials report 57 locations and 564 screens.[13]
• Harkins Theatres — a long-established, family-owned regional circuit.[14]
• Santikos Entertainment — tied to the Santikos Charitable Foundation, with proceeds supporting community causes.[15]
• Landmark Theatres — the art-house chain, owned by Cohen Media Group since 2018.[16]
• Other family- and PE-owned regionals include Cinépolis (U.S. arm of the Mexican chain), Emagine, and National Amusements (Showcase Cinemas, the Redstone family).

For pure exposure, Cinemark and AMC are the cleanest public operators; IMAX is the differentiated, higher-margin sidecar; and the private route dominates the long tail.

---

5. How the money works

A movie theater has two profit engines that behave very differently.

Engine 1 — the box office (thin, shared). The theater does not keep the ticket price. It splits box-office revenue with the film's distributor ("film rental") under a sliding scale that heavily favors the studio early. On a major release, the studio can take 60–70% or more in the opening weeks, with the exhibitor's share rising the longer a film stays on screen.[28] Because attendance drops fast after opening weekend, over a full run exhibitors typically keep only roughly 45–50% of the box office. Cinemark's 2025 results make the scale concrete: film-rental-and-advertising expense of $877.0 million ran against $1.545 billion of admissions revenue — roughly 57 cents of every admissions dollar flowed back out.[7] Tickets, in other words, largely pay the studio and cover the lights.

Engine 2 — concessions (fat, kept). The theater keeps essentially all concession revenue, and gross margins on popcorn, soda, and candy routinely run 80–90%+ — a bucket of popcorn costing under a dollar sells for ten or more.[28] Concessions are where a multiplex actually makes its profit. Cinemark booked $1.545 billion of admissions against $1.227 billion of concession revenue in 2025 — concessions nearly matched tickets on the top line and dwarfed them on profit.[7]

Supporting revenue: on-screen advertising, premium-format upcharges, online ticketing fees, gift cards, private/auditorium rentals, alternative content (concerts, sports, faith-based and anime programming), and subscription/loyalty programs (AMC Stubs, Cinemark Movie Club) that pull frequency and pre-commit spend.[6]

Cost behavior is mixed, and that is the point:

• Film rental is largely variable and rises with admissions.
• Concession supplies are variable; pricing and product mix drive contribution.
• Labor has a fixed staffing floor but flexes with attendance and amenities.
• Rent is usually a fixed monthly obligation, sometimes with percentage rent on top; utilities, maintenance, insurance, property taxes, and card fees are semi-variable.[7]

The metrics operators watch: attendance/admissions (the master driver); average ticket price (up from about $9.16 in 2019 to $11.51 across North America in 2024, with premium seats pushing the transaction-level average higher);[6] concession spend per patron ("per cap"); admissions and concession revenue per screen; film rental as a percentage of admissions; rent and labor per patron; loyalty membership; and maintenance capital spending. Premium large-format (PLF) screens — IMAX, Dolby Cinema, 4DX, and chains' own brands like AMC Prime and Cinemark XD — now drive more than 16% of domestic ticket sales, up from under 14% two years earlier, because they carry higher prices and margins.[22]

Why the model is volatile: costs are largely fixed, so the business has heavy operating leverage. A strong slate fills fixed seats and drops straight to profit; a weak slate leaves the same costs against far less revenue. That is why a chain can swing from record revenue to a large loss on the same asset base — visible in AMC's 2025 net loss despite ~$4.85 billion of revenue.[6]

---

6. What drives demand

The most comparable public demand series combines the United States and Canada: North American box office was about $8.75 billion on 760 million admissions in 2024, at an average ticket price of $11.51; in 2019 it was $11.4 billion on 1.244 billion admissions at $9.16.[6] The gap between those years is the industry's whole story — prices are up, but volume is far below the old norm.

The main demand drivers:

1. The film slate — dominant. A theater cannot create demand without attractive releases. Attendance tracks how many appealing wide releases studios put out and how well they perform. Moviegoing has shifted from a habit to an event: audiences turn out in force for a handful of blockbusters and stay home for the rest.[22] A crowded, high-quality slate is the industry's lifeblood; a thin one is an emergency.
2. Theatrical windows and streaming. Every film eventually reaches home viewing; the length of a movie's theaters-only window shapes whether people bother to go out (Section 7). Exhibition competes directly with streaming.[7]
3. Consumer discretionary spending and price. Cinemas compete for entertainment dollars and leisure time; ticket and concession prices affect frequency, especially for lower-income households.
4. Premiumization. Recliners, laser projection, big-format screens, motion seating, and dine-in service raise the value of a trip out relative to the couch, supporting price even as volume stays soft.
5. Alternative content. Concert films, live sports, classic re-releases, anime, and specialty titles diversify the calendar and fill screens between major releases.
6. Local trade areas. Population, household income, parking, nearby restaurants and retail, and competing venues determine each theater's economics.
7. Seasonality. Revenue concentrates in summer (May–August) and the winter holidays, making quarterly results lumpy.

The recent revenue recovery has leaned on higher prices and premium formats; lower attendance frequency remains the central structural issue.

---

7. Regulation

Exhibition is a lightly regulated business, but several policy threads matter.

The end of the Paramount Consent Decrees. From 1948 until 2020, court orders arising from United States v. Paramount Pictures barred Hollywood studios from owning theaters and outlawed practices like block-booking. On August 7, 2020, a federal court granted the Department of Justice's (DOJ's) request to terminate these decrees.[18] Studios may now own theaters again — Sony's 2024 purchase of Alamo Drafthouse is the first concrete result.[17] Termination does not eliminate ordinary antitrust review, and the long-run competitive implications (studio-owned chains favoring their own films) are still unfolding.

The theatrical window — negotiated, not regulated. No law sets how long a film must play only in theaters before moving to home viewing. The window collapsed during the pandemic and has since stretched back out to a de-facto norm of about 45 days before premium video-on-demand (PVOD — a one-time paid rental or purchase, distinct from a subscription). In 2025 the biggest films averaged roughly 51 days, and Disney ran the longest windows (about 57 days).[23][24] The exhibitor trade body, Cinema United (formerly the National Association of Theatre Owners, NATO), is pressing studios to commit to a 45-day minimum and "only in theatres" marketing.[25] Window length is now a central commercial battleground between studios and theaters.

Accessibility. The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) requires public accommodations, including theaters, to provide effective communication. Federal rules require theaters to offer closed captioning and audio description for digital films distributed with those features (subject to undue-burden and fundamental-alteration limits) and to communicate their availability.[19]

Copyright and anti-camcording. Public performance is one of the exclusive rights of a motion-picture copyright owner, so exhibitors need proper licensing; federal law separately prohibits unauthorized recording (camcording) inside an exhibition facility.[20]

Everyday compliance. Standard business regulation applies: state and local liquor licensing for dine-in cinemas that serve alcohol; zoning, occupancy, fire, building, and food-service codes; wage, labor, and workplace-safety rules; and consumer-protection, ticketing, loyalty-program, and data-privacy obligations. Film ratings (G/PG/PG-13/R/NC-17) are voluntary industry self-regulation through the Motion Picture Association's Classification and Rating Administration (CARA), not government censorship.

---

8. Competitive dynamics and consolidation

A concentrated top, a fragmented tail. AMC, Regal, and Cinemark are the "big three" national circuits; AMC's 2025 filing estimated the three together generated about 54% of North American box-office revenue.[6] The federal concentration statistics tell a compatible story from a different angle — CR4 of 56%, CR8 of 62.3%, and an HHI of 1,017 for 2022 — a concentrated revenue base above hundreds of local and specialty operators.[2] (Census firm-concentration and chain-level market share are different measures and should not be matched mechanically.)

Scale helps with film booking and distributor relationships, national advertising and loyalty programs, equipment and concession purchasing, technology deployment, centralized scheduling and pricing, and overhead absorption. But competition is still local: a national chain can face intense pressure from another chain, an independent, or a premium-format venue within a single trade area.

Consolidation is driven by distress, not empire-building. The pandemic pushed multiple chains into bankruptcy — Cineworld/Regal (filed 2022, emerged 2023) and Alamo (2021) among them.[29] The footprint is being pruned: weak locations close, screen count falls, and survivors reinvest in premium formats. Expect continued closure of marginal sites and selective acquisition of good real estate rather than aggressive new-build expansion.

A new entrant type — the studio-owner. With the Paramount decrees gone, studios can re-enter exhibition. Sony/Alamo is the template, and streamers' acquisitions of showcase venues signal they too value a theatrical shopfront.[17] This blurs the historic wall between the people who make films and the people who show them.

---

9. Risks

• Content/slate risk. The industry is a hostage to Hollywood's output. The 2023 Writers Guild and actors' (SAG-AFTRA) strikes shut down production and hollowed out the 2024 release calendar, hurting theaters a year later — a reminder that exhibitors bear risks they do not control.
• Structural demand erosion. The core question is whether the drop from 1.24 billion to ~780 million annual admissions is cyclical or permanent.[21] If casual moviegoing keeps fading, the whole footprint is oversized.
• Streaming and windows. Shorter theatrical windows and substitution toward home viewing can cut frequency and weaken the value of standard auditoriums.[7]
• Fixed-cost / financial leverage. Rent, debt service, maintenance, and minimum staffing continue through weak periods; high lease-adjusted leverage can turn a temporary attendance dip into a liquidity problem. AMC carries over $4 billion of debt and posted a ~$632 million net loss in 2025 even as revenue rose.[6]
• Distributor bargaining power. AMC reported that its seven largest studio distributors accounted for roughly 83% of its U.S. admissions revenue in 2025 — a concentrated set of suppliers with strong leverage over film-rental terms.[6]
• Input-cost risk. Wages, concession costs, utilities, insurance, and repairs can rise faster than ticket and concession prices.[7]
• Real-estate risk. Many theaters anchor malls and shopping centers under long leases; retail-real-estate weakness or landlord distress compounds the operating risk.
• Capital intensity. Operators must continually reinvest in projection, sound, seating, food service, accessibility, and premium formats.
• Regulatory / execution risk. Accessibility failures, liquor violations, labor disputes, data breaches, or antitrust issues create cost and reputational exposure.
• Speculative-trading distortion (public markets). AMC in particular became a "meme stock," with a share price and share count driven at times by retail-trader dynamics rather than fundamentals — a specific hazard for public-market buyers.

---

10. How to invest, and the outlook

Public markets

• Operators: Cinemark (CNK) is the profitable, dividend-paying, best-managed pure play; AMC (AMC) is the largest and most leveraged, with meme-stock volatility that makes it speculative; Marcus (MCS) blends theaters with hotels; Reading International (RDI) is a small-cap operator-plus-real-estate.
• Picks-and-shovels: IMAX (IMAX) is the asset-light technology/licensing bet — it profits from premium screens without carrying the chains' lease burden.
• Adjacent: National CineMedia (NCMI) for cinema advertising; EPR Properties (EPR) to own the buildings as a landlord rather than the operations.

Evaluate direct operators on attendance recovery, average ticket price, concession spend per patron, same-theater revenue, screen productivity, film-rental rates, lease-adjusted debt, liquidity, and maintenance capital spending. Compare enterprise value with EBITDA (earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization) while treating lease obligations as a real claim on cash flow; free cash flow (FCF) is more informative than reported net income when depreciation and lease structures differ. Adjacent names underwrite differently — the landlord on tenant credit and rent coverage, IMAX on installations and licensing economics, and mixed businesses (Marcus, Reading) on segment-level analysis rather than a single theater multiple. These are cyclical, leverage-heavy names where one year's slate can distort earnings, so reserve valuation judgments (multiples, yields) for your own diligence.

Private markets

• Institutional: the largest chains outside AMC/Cinemark are private-equity- or strategically owned (Regal via Cineworld's creditors; Alamo via Sony), so large-scale private exposure runs through those sponsors or their debt. Routes include acquisition or recapitalization of regional chains, theater real estate leased to exhibitors, distressed assets needing refurbishment or lease restructuring, and private debt secured by venue cash flow or real estate.
• Small-business: the fragmented tail means an individual can realistically buy and operate a single-screen or small regional theater — a hands-on route unusual for a consumer industry with billion-dollar public peers.

Private diligence hinges on the same levers as the giants: location-level attendance, local competition, rent per patron, concession economics, film-booking access, maintenance needs, lease maturities, working-capital requirements, and the cost of upgrading the customer experience.

Outlook

Sentiment is the most positive since the pandemic. Analysts project 2026 domestic box office near $9.6 billion, up roughly 11% year over year, on the strongest release slate in years — an Avatar: Fire and Ash carryover into January, plus Super Mario Galaxy, Toy Story 5, Spider-Man: Brand New Day, Avengers: Doomsday, and Dune: Part Three, among others.[26][27] A stacked slate is precisely what this fixed-cost industry needs to convert soft attendance into profit.

The judgment, though, is that the base case is an uneven cyclical recovery rather than a full return to the old attendance model. Premium formats, food service, loyalty programs, and alternative content can lift revenue and profit per patron, but higher prices alone are unlikely to restore historical visit frequency. The best businesses will pair strong local real estate with disciplined leases, differentiated experiences, high concession capture, and enough financial flexibility to survive weak release periods; the weakest remain exposed to standard-screen commoditization, excessive rent, and debt that assumes a return to pre-pandemic attendance. The durable question is whether stretched windows, premiumization, and a leaner footprint can stabilize attendance at a permanently lower level — or whether the long slide resumes once the tentpoles thin out.

---

Sources

1. U.S. Census Bureau, County Business Patterns 2023, NAICS 512131 (establishments, employment, payroll). https://data.census.gov/table/CBP2023.CB2300CBP
2. U.S. Census Bureau, 2022 Economic Census, Concentration of Largest Firms (firms, receipts, CR4/CR8/CR20/CR50, HHI), NAICS 512131. https://data.census.gov/table/ECNSIZE2022.EC2200SIZECONCEN
3. U.S. Census Bureau, County Business Patterns Methodology (coverage/undercount). https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/cbp/technical-documentation/methodology.html
4. U.S. Census Bureau, 2022 NAICS: 512131 Motion Picture Theaters (except Drive-Ins) definition. https://www.census.gov/naics/?details=512131&input=512131&year=2022
5. U.S. Small Business Administration, Table of Small Business Size Standards, 2023, NAICS 512131. https://www.sba.gov/document/support-table-size-standards
6. AMC Entertainment Holdings, Inc., 2025 Form 10-K, U.S. SEC. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1411579/000141157926000016/amc-20251231x10k.htm
7. Cinemark Holdings, Inc., 2025 Form 10-K, U.S. SEC. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1385280/000119312526056015/cnk-20251231.htm
8. The Marcus Corporation, 2025 Form 10-K, U.S. SEC. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/62234/000006223426000011/mcs-20251231.htm
9. Reading International, Inc., 2025 Form 10-K, U.S. SEC. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/716634/000071663426000005/rdi-20251231x10k.htm
10. IMAX Corporation, 2025 Form 10-K, U.S. SEC. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/921582/000162828026011770/imax-20251231.htm
11. EPR Properties, 2025 Form 10-K, U.S. SEC. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1045450/000104545026000007/epr-20251231.htm
12. Regal (Cineworld), "About Regal," 2026. https://www.regmovies.com/about
13. B&B Theatres, "About Us / Our History," 2026. https://www.bbtheatres.com/about/
14. Harkins Theatres, "Celebrate 90 Years of Ultimate Moviegoing" (press release), 2023. https://cms.harkins.com/docs/default-source/default-document-library/90th-anniversary-press-release.pdf?sfvrsn=32805ef7_2
15. Santikos Entertainment, "About Us," 2026. https://www.santikos.com/aboutus
16. Landmark Theatres (Cohen Media Group), "About," 2026. https://store.landmarktheatres.com/pages/about
17. Sony Pictures Entertainment, "Sony Pictures Entertainment Acquires Alamo Drafthouse Cinema," 2024. https://www.sonypictures.com/corp/press_releases/2024/0612/sonypicturesentertainmentacquiresalamodrafthousecinema
18. U.S. Department of Justice, "Federal Court Terminates Paramount Consent Decrees," 2020. https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/federal-court-terminates-paramount-consent-decrees
19. U.S. Department of Justice, "Movie Theaters; Movie Captioning and Audio Description" (ADA rule), 2016. https://archive.ada.gov/regs2016/movie_rule.htm
20. U.S. Copyright Office, "What Is Copyright?" 2026. https://www.copyright.gov/what-is-copyright/
21. Deadline, "Box Office: 2025 Admissions at 780M, -5% From 2024," 2026. https://deadline.com/2026/01/box-office-2025-admissions-1236660208/
22. MMCG Invest, "The Incredible Shrinking Multiplex: Inside the Movie Theater Industry's Fight for Survival," 2026. https://www.mmcginvest.com/post/the-incredible-shrinking-multiplex-inside-the-movie-theater-industry-s-fight-for-survival
23. TheWrap, "Why Movie Studios Are Embracing Longer Theatrical Windows," 2026. https://www.thewrap.com/creative-content/movies/theatrical-windows-box-office-45-days/
24. ScreenRant, "Theaters Vs. Streaming: How Major Studios Handled Theatrical Windows in 2025," 2025. https://screenrant.com/movie-studios-2025-theatrical-release-windows-explainer/
25. Cinema United, "Strength of Theatrical Exhibition — 2025 Update," 2025. https://cinemaunited.org/2025/12/17/cinema-united-releases-strength-of-theatrical-exhibition-2025-update-spotlighting-important-movie-theatre-industry-metrics/
26. Variety, "Box Office Predictions 2026: Avengers: Doomsday, Spider-Man, Odyssey," 2026. https://variety.com/2026/film/news/box-office-2026-predictions-avengers-doomsday-spiderman-brand-new-day-odyssey-1236615235/
27. Advanced Television, "Forecast: 2026 to see biggest domestic box office since Covid," 2026. https://www.advanced-television.com/2026/01/08/forecast-2026-to-see-biggest-domestic-box-office-since-covid/
28. RogerEbert.com, "How your ticket price is divided" (film-rental splits and concession margins). https://www.rogerebert.com/roger-ebert/how-your-ticket-price-is-divided
29. The Spokesman-Review, "Regal Cinemas owner files for Chapter 11 bankruptcy," 2022 (Cineworld/Regal filing; emerged 2023). https://www.spokesman.com/stories/2022/sep/07/regal-cinemas-owner-files-for-chapter-11-bankruptc/