Couriers and Express Delivery Services (U.S.) — NAICS 492110

1. Overview

This is the business of picking up parcels in one place and delivering them somewhere else, fast and at scale — the national and international package networks behind almost every online order, shipped document, and overnight medical sample. In federal statistics it is North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) code 492110, "Couriers and Express Delivery Services." Think UPS, FedEx, and DHL Express: fleets of trucks, sortation hubs, and — for the largest players — their own cargo airlines. At its core it is a network business, built around sorting hubs, transportation capacity, route density, delivery labor, and tracking technology.[1]

Why it matters to an investor: parcel delivery is the physical backbone of e-commerce — a service every retailer, manufacturer, hospital, and household depends on and cannot easily replicate. It is a scale-and-density business with very high barriers to entry, which historically produced a durable, cash-generative duopoly. But it is also cyclical, labor-heavy, capital-hungry, and — unusually — being reshaped by its own biggest customer, Amazon, which turned itself into the largest package carrier by volume.

The central question is not simply whether parcel volume grows. It is whether a carrier can add density, protect revenue per package, control labor and transportation costs, and earn acceptable returns on hubs, vehicles, aircraft, and technology.

Public vs. private ways in. The two cleanest public plays are UPS and FedEx, both large-cap U.S.-listed carriers. Beyond them the sector is unusually hard to buy: the volume leader (Amazon's logistics arm) is buried inside a trillion-dollar retailer, the third pillar (the U.S. Postal Service) is a government entity you cannot own, and the fast-growing regional carriers are almost all private-equity- or venture-backed. That mismatch — a huge, essential industry with only two obvious stocks — defines the investable landscape.

2. What it is and how it's structured

NAICS 492110 covers establishments primarily engaged in air, surface, or combined-mode courier and express delivery of parcels and documents, generally between metro areas or internationally, without a universal-service obligation, and typically including the local pickup and delivery tied to that network.[1] The defining features are a scheduled, time-definite service (next-day, two-day, ground) and an integrated network of pickup, line-haul (the long-distance leg), sortation hubs, and last-mile delivery.

The industry spans national integrated carriers (UPS, FedEx), international networks (DHL Express), retailer-controlled delivery networks (Amazon's logistics operations), regional last-mile carriers and local contractors, and specialized medical, legal, perishable, and time-sensitive couriers.

What it excludes matters here, because the "parcel economy" the public pictures is spread across several codes:

Ownership mix and the contractor quirk. The industry is dominated by a handful of very large, capital-intensive integrated carriers with a long tail of small local and contract operators; the federal tables do not break out a percentage split by ownership type. Two structural quirks shape the labor picture: FedEx historically delivered ground parcels through independent service providers (ISPs) — independent contracting companies, not FedEx employees — while Amazon delivers through Delivery Service Partners (DSPs), thousands of small businesses running branded routes, plus Flex gig drivers. So a large share of the people delivering "big-carrier" packages work for small firms, not the household name on the truck.

3. How big it is

Federal figures for NAICS 492110 (our ground-truth Census and SBA data):

The concentration is extreme: the top four firms take 87.7% of receipts, and adding the next 46 firms moves that only to 90.9%.[2] A few giants earn almost all the money; everyone else splits the remainder. (The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index — HHI, a standard single-number concentration score — is suppressed in the federal data, so we do not state it.)

The undercount caveat is important. The $132.3 billion NAICS figure is not the size of the U.S. parcel-delivery economy. County Business Patterns (CBP) counts only employer establishments with paid employees, excludes USPS and most government employees, and does not fully capture nonemployer businesses; retailers may also book delivery costs inside retail or fulfillment operations rather than under a courier establishment.[3] By design the code leaves out two of the four biggest carriers: the U.S. Postal Service (a government entity in code 491, with roughly $32.3 billion of shipping-and-packages revenue and about 7.3 billion parcels in fiscal 2024)[5] and much of local/same-day gig delivery (code 492210). It also only partly captures Amazon's in-house delivery, which runs through independent DSPs and gig drivers. Counting all carriers, the U.S. moved roughly 22.4 billion parcels in 2024, with total carrier revenue across UPS, FedEx, USPS, Amazon and others on the order of $200 billion.[6] Read the federal figure as "the private, network-carrier core," not the whole parcel world.

Carrier-level 2024 snapshot (all carriers):

Sources: Pitney Bowes (revenue) and ShipMatrix (volume).[6][7] The split tells the story: UPS and FedEx lead on revenue (heavier, higher-priced, business and express packages), while USPS and Amazon lead on volume (many light, cheap, residential e-commerce parcels). Amazon Logistics handled roughly 6.3 billion parcels in 2024, up ~7.3% year over year, and is widely expected to pass USPS as the largest carrier by volume around 2028.[7]

4. The investable universe

For a purely national parcel-network business, the public menu is short. Ticker symbols below use the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), Nasdaq, or Germany's Xetra; an American depositary receipt (ADR) — a U.S.-traded proxy for a foreign share — is noted where relevant. (Prices, yields, and valuation multiples are discussed in Section 10, not here.)

Public companies:

Two adjacencies investors often confuse with parcel carriers: contract-logistics and freight-brokerage names (GXO Logistics, RXO, XPO) and LTL freight carriers (Old Dominion, Saia, and now FedEx Freight). They ride the same e-commerce and industrial-shipping trends but are different businesses — warehousing, brokerage, and pallet freight, not parcel delivery.

Major private and non-investable operators:

• U.S. Postal Service — the largest carrier by volume; a government entity, not investable.
• Regional last-mile carriers, nearly all private-equity- or venture-backed and pitched as FedEx/UPS alternatives: OnTrac (which absorbed LaserShip — a coast-to-coast network backed by American Securities and Greenbriar Equity Group; ~35 states, ~70% of the population), GLS US, Veho, Better Trucks, AxleHire, Jitsu, and Roadie (a crowdsourced same-day platform UPS acquired in 2021).[11][13] This group grew ~23% in 2024 as shippers diversified away from the two giants.[7]
• Amazon's DSP network — thousands of small delivery businesses operating branded routes under contract.

Bottom line for allocators: this is a two-stock public sector (UPS and FDX) plus a diversified conglomerate (Amazon) and a foreign-listed parent (Deutsche Post DHL). Direct exposure to the fast-growing regional and gig segments is largely a private-markets game. Private-company revenue, ownership, and profitability are not disclosed in the federal statistics.

5. How the money works

Parcel carriers make money by charging per package and running each package over a shared, mostly fixed network. The engine is not the price of any one shipment — it's density and network utilization:

Revenue = package volume × yield per package + surcharges + value-added services.

Revenue (yield per piece). Price is set by weight, size, distance (zone), and speed. Two levers matter most:

• Dimensional weight — carriers bill on whichever is greater, actual weight or a volume-based "dim weight," pushing shippers toward smaller, denser packages and protecting the carrier from hauling boxes of air.[14]
• Surcharges — fuel surcharges (indexed to fuel prices, adjusted frequently) and peak-season surcharges around the holidays are major, high-margin levers layered on top of base rates.

An express next-day-air package earns far more than a light residential ground parcel — exactly why the revenue-vs-volume split in Section 3 looks the way it does. The industry's equivalent of factory-capacity utilization is network density: packages per route, stops per driver, sort-center throughput, and aircraft/vehicle load factors.

Cost. The dominant cost is labor (drivers, sorters, and, for UPS and FedEx, pilots), followed by fuel, aircraft and vehicle capital, contractor/purchased-transportation payments, and the fixed cost of hubs and sortation facilities. Because so much cost is fixed, the profit question is: how many packages can you push over the same routes and hubs?

Density is everything. The core unit is cost per stop and per package, and it falls sharply as deliveries cluster. Industry estimates put a ~5–7% cut in last-mile cost per package for every ~10% gain in delivery density; going from 20 to 30 drops per route can cut cost per delivery by roughly a third. Last-mile delivery is estimated at 41–53% of total shipping cost, and a failed delivery costs roughly $17 to re-attempt.[15] This math is the moat: a new entrant with a thin route cannot approach the cost of an incumbent whose truck already passes every house on the street.

"Revenue quality" over volume. The current strategy, led by UPS, prizes margin per piece over raw package count — trading low-yield, high-volume e-commerce parcels (classically Amazon's) for higher-yield healthcare and small-business shipments. The most-watched operating metrics are average daily volume (ADV) and revenue per piece. In 2025:

• UPS reported global small-package ADV of 20.847 million packages/day and average revenue per piece of $14.50; its U.S. domestic operation ran 17.510 million/day at $13.21.[9]
• FedEx's Federal Express segment reported ADV of ~17.001 million/day at a composite yield of $15.86.[10]
• UPS's 2025 volume fell 7.0% even as revenue per piece rose 6.6% — the volume-vs-revenue-quality trade-off in one line.[9]

These are company figures with different scopes, not NAICS totals. The relevant scorecards for owners are operating margin and revenue per piece, not just volume growth.

The contractor lever. Using ISPs (FedEx historically) and DSPs/gig drivers (Amazon) shifts labor cost and legal risk off the carrier's balance sheet onto small contractors — cheaper and more flexible, but a growing regulatory liability (Section 7).

6. What drives demand

• E-commerce, above all. Online retail is the primary demand engine; parcel volume tracks the shift of spending online more than anything else. U.S. retail e-commerce sales were an estimated $326.7 billion in the first quarter of 2026 — 16.9% of all retail sales, up 9.8% year over year.[16] (E-commerce sales are a demand proxy, not a direct measure of courier revenue.)
• Consumer spending and the broader economy. Retail sales, gross domestic product (GDP), and holiday shopping drive residential volume; volumes are cyclical and softened after the pandemic surge normalized.
• Business-to-business and industrial shipping, plus high-value verticals like healthcare and pharmaceuticals, which carriers court because they pay premium, time-sensitive rates.[9][10]
• Speed expectations. Same-day and next-day promises shift the mix toward faster, denser, more local delivery — favoring regional carriers and Amazon's metro networks.
• Seasonality, historically concentrated in the Q4 holiday peak. Peaks lift volume and surcharge revenue but require temporary labor and reserve capacity; subscription programs and year-round flash sales have flattened the curve somewhat and raised baseline daily volume.[17]
• Captive-network diversion. Amazon and other large retailers can route more volume through their own networks, shrinking the addressable market for third-party carriers.
• Cross-border e-commerce and trade policy. International parcel flows (including low-cost imports from platforms like Shein and Temu) are sensitive to customs rules such as the U.S. "de minimis" duty-free threshold; recent tightening of that rule is a direct demand variable for cross-border parcels.

7. Regulation

Parcel carriers are among the more heavily regulated service businesses because they run trucks, aircraft, and large workforces:

• Postal law. Title 39, Section 601 of the U.S. Code (the "Private Express Statutes") governs private carriage of letters and grants specific exceptions; it is not a blanket prohibition on private parcel delivery, which is why UPS, FedEx, and others operate freely in packages.[18]
• The competitor's regulator. The Postal Regulatory Commission (PRC) oversees USPS pricing across separate "market-dominant" and "competitive" product classes with different pricing and cost rules.[19] Private carriers aren't governed by it, but USPS rate decisions and its "Delivering for America" network overhaul move the whole market — and USPS shifting air cargo away from FedEx toward UPS in 2024 shows how much that government player matters.
• Ground fleets answer to the U.S. Department of Transportation and its Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) — commercial driver's license (CDL) rules, hours-of-service limits, and vehicle safety[20] — plus the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) for dangerous goods.
• Air operations. UPS and FedEx run large certificated cargo airlines regulated by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), including hazardous-materials handling and training.[21] That also changes their labor law: FedEx Express employees fall under the Railway Labor Act (RLA), the framework for airlines and railroads, which makes national unionization and strikes far harder — a structural contrast with UPS's ground workforce, organized by the International Brotherhood of Teamsters under ordinary labor law.
• Worker classification is the hottest front. State laws like California's AB5 (and its "ABC test") and the ballot-driven carve-out Proposition 22, plus shifting federal Department of Labor rules, govern whether gig and contractor drivers are employees or independent contractors.[22] Because ISP/DSP/gig models depend on contractor status, reclassification is a real cost and legal risk; FedEx's filings specifically flag contractor and labor-law exposure.[10]
• Environmental mandates. California's Advanced Clean Fleets and similar rules push carriers toward electric delivery vehicles — a multi-year capital commitment.
• International compliance. Customs, sanctions, export controls, aviation security, and restricted-goods rules govern cross-border shipments.

8. Competitive dynamics and consolidation

For decades the U.S. picture was a stable UPS–FedEx duopoly in national ground-and-air parcel, with USPS as the essential third pillar (cheap, light, last-mile-to-every-address). Three forces have reshaped it:

1. Amazon went from customer to competitor. Amazon Logistics is now the largest carrier by volume and is expected to overtake USPS around 2028.[7] Its scale gives it duopoly-grade density in metros — and it has signaled it will sell delivery to third parties, turning an internal cost center into a rival network.
2. The UPS–Amazon divorce. UPS is deliberately cutting Amazon volume by more than 50% (2025 into mid-2026), accepting lower revenue to raise margin. Amazon was UPS's largest customer at roughly 11% of revenue in 2024, falling to 10.6% in 2025 as the cuts progressed.[9][25] This simultaneously shrinks UPS's network and hands more volume to Amazon's own trucks and to regional carriers.
3. Regional carriers are back. Shippers who want to avoid single-carrier dependence are spreading volume to a resurgent regional tier — OnTrac (merged LaserShip/OnTrac), GLS, Veho, Better Trucks, AxleHire — which often undercut national rates by 10–35% in their zones.[13] The group grew ~23% in 2024.[7]

Meanwhile the incumbents are simplifying. FedEx merged its Express and Ground operations into one network ("Network 2.0," under its DRIVE cost program) and spun off FedEx Freight as a separate NYSE-listed company (FDXF) on June 1, 2026 to focus the parent on parcels.[10][11] DHL stepped back from U.S. domestic ground/express to concentrate on international.[12]

Judgment. National networks keep durable advantages in density, brand trust, delivery data, customer integrations, and capital access. New entrants can still win in dense urban markets, specialized services (medical, legal, perishable), and retailer-specific last-mile, where lower costs or more flexible labor offset the lack of a nationwide footprint. Future consolidation is more likely to come from regional roll-ups, partnerships, contractor networks, and facility rationalization than from expanding traditional air-and-ground capacity. The market is no longer a clean duopoly but a four-way contest: two premium carriers, one government network, and one vertically integrated retailer.

9. Risks

• Cyclicality. Volumes rise and fall with consumer spending, industrial activity, business formation, and cross-border trade; post-pandemic normalization left softer growth and excess capacity, pressuring price.
• The Amazon problem, two ways. Amazon insourcing removes volume from UPS/FedEx, and Amazon-as-third-party-carrier could become a direct competitor with unmatched density.
• Customer concentration. UPS disclosed Amazon at 10.6% of consolidated revenue in 2025 — a single customer whose deliberate rundown reshapes the top line.[9]
• Labor and contractor risk. Wages are the largest cost, and the UPS workforce is heavily unionized. The 2023 Teamsters contract — a five-year deal covering ~340,000 workers, which the union said would bring roughly $170,000 in pay and benefits for a top full-time driver by 2028 — followed a near-strike and locked in higher labor costs.[23] Driver shortages, classification disputes, and service-provider failures add to the risk.
• Fixed-cost underutilization. Hubs, aircraft, vehicles, technology, and leases stay costly when volumes fall.
• Fuel. Price swings hit the cost base directly; surcharges recover much but not all, and with a lag.
• Overcapacity and price competition. After the pandemic build-out, too much capacity chasing softer volume risks a pricing war, especially as regionals undercut.
• Capital intensity. Aircraft, automated hubs, and EV fleets require heavy, continuous investment — a drag when volumes disappoint.
• Regulatory / classification and antitrust risk. Reclassifying contractor drivers as employees would raise costs across ISP/DSP/gig models; concentration, environmental rules, postal policy, and large transactions can also attract intervention.
• Trade and tariff policy. Changes to de minimis rules and tariffs can sharply cut cross-border parcel volumes.
• Service failures. Weather, cyberattacks, theft, damage, claims, and network outages can damage customer relationships.

10. How to invest and the outlook

Public routes

The two direct plays are UPS and FedEx — large-cap, dividend-paying, and both mid-restructuring (UPS shrinking to raise margin; FedEx integrating networks after spinning off its freight arm). Their forward story is explicitly margin over volume: automate the network, drop low-yield packages, and lean into higher-value healthcare and small-business shipments. UPS in particular carries a notably high dividend yield, attractive to income investors but exposed to the risk that a shrinking network strains the payout. For broader or indirect exposure, Amazon captures the fastest-growing delivery network (embedded in its retail story) and Deutsche Post DHL offers international parcel exposure on a foreign listing. Freight-adjacent names (FedEx Freight/FDXF, Old Dominion, XPO/RXO/GXO) ride similar trends but are different businesses.

Public-market analysis should emphasize normalized volume and revenue-per-package trends, operating margin by service and geography, network utilization and capital spending, labor and purchased-transportation costs, customer concentration, balance-sheet leverage, and free-cash-flow (FCF) conversion. Apply valuation multiples — price-to-earnings (P/E), enterprise-value-to-EBITDA (EV/EBITDA), FCF yield — only after normalizing for the cycle; a low multiple can reflect genuine structural pressure, not temporary weakness.

Private routes

Because the growth tier is largely private, direct exposure means private equity and venture — the PE-backed regional carriers (OnTrac and peers), last-mile technology carriers (Veho, AxleHire, Better Trucks), delivery software, automation, and private credit. Operating investors can also buy into the work rather than the stock: running a FedEx Ground ISP route business or an Amazon DSP is an owner-operator path into the industry's economics, and last-mile delivery businesses trade in a small-cap M&A market of their own.

Essential diligence questions: How many packages per route and per driver? What is the true contribution margin by lane and customer? How concentrated are customers and contracts? Who owns the vehicles, facilities, software, and routes? Are the labor and contractor arrangements legally and economically durable? What are the claims, insurance, maintenance, and peak-season costs? And — the decisive one — does growth come from genuine density or merely from adding underutilized capacity?

Outlook

Expect steady but unspectacular volume growth — roughly mid-single-digit annually, e-commerce-led, with one forecast putting the U.S. parcel market up about 36% by 2030.[24] The value, though, is likely to be decided less by volume than by three things: whether UPS's and FedEx's "shrink-to-margin" bets actually lift profitability, how far Amazon pushes into third-party delivery, and how much share the regional carriers keep taking. Automation and network redesign are the swing factor on cost; labor, fuel, and trade policy are the swing factors on risk.

The long-term demand backdrop is favorable, but the industry is not automatically a high-return growth sector. National carriers should hold strong positions where density, reliability, and integrated technology matter; regional carriers and retailer-owned networks will keep taking share in selected lanes and delivery windows. This remains an essential, entrenched, high-barrier industry — but for the first time in a generation its competitive structure is genuinely in motion, and the strongest investments will be operators that add profitable package density, preserve pricing power, and improve cash generation without overbuilding the network.

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Sources

1. U.S. Census Bureau, "NAICS 492110 — Couriers and Express Delivery Services (industry definition)," 2022. https://www.census.gov/naics/
2. U.S. Census Bureau, "2022 Economic Census — Concentration by Largest Firms, NAICS 492110" (receipts, firm count, CR4/CR8/CR20/CR50, HHI suppressed), 2022. https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/economic-census.html
3. U.S. Census Bureau, "County Business Patterns 2023 — NAICS 492110" (establishments, employment, annual payroll, first-quarter payroll), 2023. https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/cbp.html
4. U.S. Small Business Administration, "Table of Small Business Size Standards (NAICS 492110 = 1,500 employees)," 2023. https://www.sba.gov/document/support-table-size-standards
5. U.S. Postal Service, "U.S. Postal Service Reports Fiscal Year 2024 Results," 2024. https://about.usps.com/newsroom/national-releases/2024/1114-usps-reports-fiscal-year-2024-results.htm
6. Pitney Bowes, "Parcel Shipping Index 2024" (U.S. volume ~22.4 billion parcels; carrier revenue shares), 2025. https://www.pitneybowes.com/us/shipping-index.html
7. ShipMatrix / Supply Chain Dive, "FedEx, UPS alternatives grew market share in 2024" (volume shares; regional-carrier growth ~23%; Amazon trajectory), 2025. https://www.supplychaindive.com/news/fedex-ups-usps-amazon-2024-market-share/745686/
8. United Parcel Service, Inc., "Form 10-K, Fiscal Year 2024" (total revenue $91.1B), U.S. SEC, 2025. https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0001090727&type=10-K
9. United Parcel Service, Inc., "Form 10-K, Fiscal Year 2025" (global ADV 20.847M and $14.50 rev/piece; U.S. domestic 17.510M and $13.21; volume −7.0%, rev/piece +6.6%; Amazon 10.6% of revenue), U.S. SEC, 2026. https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0001090727&type=10-K
10. FedEx Corp., "Form 10-K, Fiscal Year 2025 (ended May 31, 2025)" (total revenue $87.9B; Federal Express ~17.001M ADV, $15.86 composite yield; labor/contractor risk factors), U.S. SEC, 2025. https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0001048911&type=10-K
11. FedEx, "FedEx Board Approves Spin-off of FedEx Freight" (FDXF began NYSE trading June 1, 2026), 2026. https://investors.fedex.com/fedex-freight-spin-off/default.aspx
12. FedEx Newsroom, "FedEx Welcomes the Opportunity to Provide Services to DHL Customers" (DHL U.S. domestic step-back; Deutsche Post DHL Group), 2026. https://newsroom.fedex.com/newsroom/united-states-english/fedex-welcomes-the-opportunity-to-provide-services-to-dhl-customers
13. Supply Chain Dive, "LaserShip, OnTrac deal sets regional parcel carriers up as FedEx, UPS alternatives" (regional-carrier landscape, ownership, pricing; Roadie/UPS), 2021–2024. https://www.supplychaindive.com/news/lasership-acquires-ontrac-regional-parcel-carriers-ups-fedex/608190/
14. Mordor Intelligence, "United States Domestic Courier, Express and Parcel (CEP) Market — dimensional-weight pricing and parcel-format optimization," 2025. https://www.mordorintelligence.com/industry-reports/united-states-domestic-courier-express-and-parcel-market
15. GoBolt / Capgemini / McKinsey (industry compilation), "Last-Mile Delivery Cost: density economics, share of supply-chain cost, failed-delivery cost," 2025. https://www.gobolt.com/blog/last-mile-delivery-cost/
16. U.S. Census Bureau, "Quarterly Retail E-Commerce Sales, 1st Quarter 2026" ($326.7B; 16.9% of retail; +9.8% year over year). https://www.census.gov/retail/ecommerce.html
17. Progressive Policy Institute, "Parcel Shipping and E-Commerce: Unpacking the Data," 2025. https://www.progressivepolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/PPI-Parcel-Shipping-and-Ecommerce.pdf
18. 39 U.S.C. § 601, "Letters carried out of the mail" (Private Express Statutes; exceptions to private carriage of letters). https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/39/601
19. U.S. Postal Regulatory Commission, "Market-Dominant and Competitive Products" (product-class oversight and ratemaking). https://www.prc.gov/
20. U.S. DOT Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, "Hours of Service" (CDL and hours-of-service rules). https://www.fmcsa.dot.gov/regulations/hours-of-service
21. U.S. Federal Aviation Administration, "Hazardous Materials Safety / air-carrier operations" (dangerous-goods handling and training). https://www.faa.gov/hazmat
22. California Franchise Tax Board, "Worker Classification and AB 5 (ABC test)"; California Proposition 22, 2020–2025. https://www.ftb.ca.gov/file/business/industries/worker-classification-and-ab-5-faq.html
23. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, "Teamsters Ratify Historic UPS Contract" (five-year deal, ~340,000 workers; pay-and-benefits claims), 2023. https://teamster.org/2023/08/teamsters-ratify-historic-ups-contract/
24. FreightWaves / Pitney Bowes, "US parcel market to grow ~36% by 2030," 2025. https://www.freightwaves.com/news/us-parcel-market-to-grow-36-by-2030-pitney-bowes-says
25. Supply Chain Dive, "UPS's Amazon volume cuts are nearly done. What's next?" (>50% Amazon volume cut, 2025–mid-2026; Amazon ~11% of 2024 revenue), 2025–2026. https://www.supplychaindive.com/news/ups-amazon-volume-cuts-are-nearly-done-whats-next/818673/