Sporting Goods Retailers (U.S.) — NAICS 459110

A Histometrics industry primer for public-market and private investors.

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1. Overview

Sporting goods retailers sell the new gear people use to play, train, hunt, fish, camp, and stay fit — everything from running shoes and basketballs to treadmills, kayaks, rifles, bicycles, and camping tents. Under the U.S. government's industry-classification system (NAICS, the North American Industry Classification System), this is code 459110, covering establishments whose primary business is selling new sporting goods.[1]

This is a large, mature, discretionary-spending business — Americans buy roughly $82 billion a year through dedicated sporting goods stores alone[2] — and it is being reshaped by two forces at once: online and mass-merchant competition (Amazon, Walmart) squeezing the middle, and a wave of consolidation concentrating the survivors. It is a useful barometer of consumer health because almost everything sold here is a "want," not a "need."

Ways in, public and private. The number of ways to invest directly in this industry through the public stock market has actually shrunk in the last two years. As of mid-2026 there are essentially two U.S.-listed pure-play sporting goods retailers of scale — DICK'S Sporting Goods and Academy Sports + Outdoors — plus smaller Sportsman's Warehouse, after Foot Locker, Hibbett, and Big 5 all left the public market via buyouts. Everything else is private: a family-controlled outdoor empire (Bass Pro Shops/Cabela's), a member-owned cooperative (REI), foreign-listed owners (JD Sports Fashion), employee-owned and family chains (Scheels, L.L.Bean), and thousands of independent local shops. That mix — a thin public field sitting on top of a long private tail — is the defining feature of the industry for investors. Private investors reach it through direct acquisition, private credit, retail real estate, distribution, and supplier relationships as much as through equity.

The investment judgment in one line: this is a durable but execution-heavy retail category. Participation and brand innovation support demand; inventory, promotions, leases, tariffs, vendor power, and consumer trade-down determine returns.

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2. What it is and how it's structured

In scope (459110): stores primarily selling new sporting goods — bicycles and parts, camping and hiking gear, exercise and fitness equipment, athletic uniforms, specialty sports footwear, golf and tennis equipment, fishing and hunting supplies, firearms and ammunition sold through sporting-goods outlets, and diving and ski gear.[1] A store-based retailer that also sells online stays in 459110; the 2022 NAICS revision deliberately de-emphasized the sales channel, so an omnichannel sporting-goods store is not reclassified just because part of its sales are digital.[1]

What it explicitly excludes — this matters, because the exclusions are where a large share of "sporting goods" money actually goes:

• General-merchandise and warehouse-club chains (Walmart, Target, Costco) — the General Merchandise Retailers group (NAICS 455). They sell enormous volumes of sporting goods but are counted elsewhere.
• Broad online marketplaces and mail-order sellers (Amazon's own retail sales) — classified by their primary merchandise mix, not as sporting-goods stores. (Under NAICS 2022 the old "Nonstore Retailers" subsector 454 was folded into merchandise-based codes, so general e-commerce is not booked as 459110.)[1]
• Athletic apparel and shoe specialty stores (a standalone Nike or Lululemon store) — Clothing, Shoe, and Accessories Retailers (NAICS 458, e.g., footwear 458210).[1]
• Used sporting goods and used bikes (e.g., Play It Again Sports) — Used Merchandise Retailers (NAICS 459510).[1]
• Repair without retail sales (NAICS 811490); camping trailers/truck campers (441210), boats and outboard motors (441222), and snowmobiles, ATVs, and motorcycles (441227); golf courses (713910), marinas (713930), and shooting ranges (713990).[1]

Formats within the industry. Full-line big-box chains; outdoor and hunting/fishing destinations; running, golf, cycling, team-sports, and fitness specialists; sports-fashion footwear and apparel chains; and cooperatives, employee-owned, family-owned, and independent stores — most now operating omnichannel (stores plus web, mobile, and "buy online, pick up in store," or BOPIS).

Ownership mix. The industry is overwhelmingly small, independent operators with a thin layer of national chains on top. Federal data count 17,834 firms running 20,373 establishments — barely more than one store per firm, so the typical operator is a single-location shop.[2][3] Yet a handful of chains each run hundreds of stores, so store count is fragmented while sales concentrate at the top. Franchising is rare here: the big players are corporate-owned chains and the small players are independent proprietors, not franchisees. (Federal concentration statistics, below, measure receipts share — they are not an ownership breakdown of public vs. private.)

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3. How big it is

Federal statistics for NAICS 459110 (our ground-truth figures). Note two different vintages: 2022 Economic Census for receipts/firms/concentration, and 2023 County Business Patterns (CBP) for establishments, employment, and payroll.

A few things fall out of these numbers. Average sales run roughly $4 million per store (≈$81.7B ÷ 20,373).[2][3] Average pay works out to about $29,400 per employee per year (≈$7.43B ÷ 252,338)[3] — low, reflecting a heavily part-time, hourly retail workforce. And the $26.5 million size standard means the Small Business Administration (SBA) treats almost every operator in the industry except the national chains as a "small business."[4] These federal figures do not report profitability, same-store sales, inventory turns, e-commerce share, or public-versus-private ownership — those come from company filings, not the census.

Undercount caveat — read this. The $81.7 billion federal figure understates how much Americans actually spend on sporting goods, for two reasons:

1. Scope. The code counts only stores whose main business is sporting goods. A very large share of sporting-goods spending flows through channels booked under other NAICS codes — Walmart/Target/Costco (general merchandise), Amazon and online-only sellers, and standalone Nike/Lululemon-type stores (apparel/footwear). Private market-research estimates that use a broader, spending-based definition put the total U.S. sporting-goods retail market closer to $105–110 billion in 2025 (IBISWorld ≈ $107.6B).[5] Treat $81.7 billion as "dedicated sporting-goods stores" and ~$107 billion as "total category spend"; the gap is the dollars captured by mass merchants, e-commerce, and apparel chains.
2. Nonemployers. CBP counts establishments with paid employees. The tiniest owner-operated shops with no employees are counted separately in Census Nonemployer Statistics, so the establishment and firm counts understate the true number of businesses at the very small end.[6]

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4. The investable universe

After a two-year consolidation wave, the U.S.-listed pure-play field is thin. Direct public exposure now runs mainly through three names, with a much larger set of private and foreign-owned players around them. (Company figures below are most-recent fiscal year, from SEC/company filings.)

U.S.- and UK-listed retailers

Recently taken private or acquired (no longer directly investable)

Major private and other owners

• Bass Pro Shops / Cabela's (parent: Great American Outdoors Group) — privately controlled by founder Johnny Morris; acquired Cabela's in 2017 (~$4B). Roughly 195 destination stores and an estimated ~$7B+ annual revenue; a dominant force in hunting, fishing, camping, and boating.[16]
• REI Co-op — a member-owned consumer cooperative founded in 1938, not a corporation; ~$3.53 billion in 2024 net sales, 25 million+ members, ~180 stores. Profits flow back to members as an annual dividend rather than to outside shareholders — strong operating quality, but no ordinary tradable equity.[17]
• L.L.Bean (private, family-owned) and Scheels (employee-owned) — large outdoor/sporting retailers reachable only through private channels.[18][19]
• Broadline retailers — Walmart, Target, Costco, and Amazon are, in dollar terms, among the biggest sellers of sporting goods in America, but sporting goods is a small slice of each, so they are indirect exposure, not sporting-goods "plays."

Bottom line for public-market investors: the focused choices are DKS (scaled leader/consolidator), ASO (value challenger), and SPWH (outdoor micro/small-cap), with JD as a UK-listed sneaker proxy. The private tail is large but reachable only through private equity, direct ownership, or the cooperative/employee-owned models.

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5. How the money works

Sporting goods retailing is a classic buy-wholesale, sell-at-markup business. Owners make money on the spread between the two — refined by a handful of retail-specific levers. The profit stack runs: sales → less merchandise cost, freight, and duties → gross profit → less store labor, occupancy, fulfillment, marketing, technology, shrink, and returns → operating profit and cash flow.

• Gross margin — what's left after the cost of the merchandise — is the first lever. Academy ran a gross margin of 34.8% in FY2025; the category typically sits in the low-to-mid 30s%.[8] Discount-driven price competition, especially online, is the constant threat to it.
• Comparable sales ("comps," or same-store sales) — the growth of sales at stores open at least a year, usually including each company's digital sales — are the headline metric, because they strip out the effect of simply opening more stores. A comp breaks into traffic (number of transactions) and ticket (average dollars per transaction). Definitions vary by company, so comps aren't perfectly comparable across names.[8][9]
• Store productivity — sales per square foot and inventory turnover. These are big-box stores with high, largely fixed occupancy (rent) costs; DICK'S calls occupancy its largest expense after merchandise.[7] Filling the floor with fast-turning inventory matters, because slow inventory ties up cash and ends in margin-killing markdowns.
• Vendor power and private label. Chains depend on a few dominant brands: DICK'S disclosed that Nike was ~31% of its consolidated merchandise purchases, with no other vendor at 10%, across ~1,500 vendors.[7] Retailers push back with in-house/vertical brands (DICK'S owns DSG, CALIA, VRST), which lift margin because the retailer keeps the manufacturer's markup too.
• Omnichannel and experiential formats. E-commerce plus BOPIS turns the store into a fulfillment and returns hub, lowering shipping cost and pulling shoppers inside; experiential concepts like DICK'S "House of Sport" (climbing walls, turf fields, batting cages) bet that a store-as-destination drives traffic and basket size in an Amazon world.

For public-market investors, that store-level economics rolls up into operating margin, earnings per share (EPS), dividends, and buybacks, and the stock trades on a price-to-earnings (P/E) multiple like any cash-generative retailer. For private owners and buyers, the same levers show up as free cash flow and, ultimately, the acquisition multiple — the metric behind the Foot Locker, Hibbett, and Big 5 deals.

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6. What drives demand

• Consumer discretionary spending and confidence. Nearly everything here is optional, so demand tracks disposable income, employment, and confidence; a middle-income pullback shows up fast in the category.
• Sports and fitness participation. Youth-sports enrollment and school calendars, gym/running culture, home fitness, and outdoor-recreation trends (a durable lift since 2020) set the baseline size of the market. As a rough participation gauge, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) reported 47.2% of U.S. adults met federal aerobic-activity guidelines in 2024 — an indicator, not a sales forecast.[20]
• Athleisure and footwear cycles. Athletic apparel and sneakers as everyday fashion — not just for playing sports — are a major, style-driven demand engine, and new footwear launches pull traffic.
• Product replacement and innovation; big events. Gear wears out and gets re-bought; technical innovation and athlete-driven launches accelerate it; Olympics, World Cups, and championship runs lift team and licensed-apparel sales.
• Seasonality and weather. Back-to-school and the winter holidays are the peak selling windows; hunting, fishing, ski, and camping demand swings with the seasons and the weather.
• Prices, input costs, and tariffs. Because so much gear and footwear is imported, tariffs and freight feed straight into shelf prices and margins. The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) reported sporting-goods prices up 4.5% year over year in June 2026 (sports vehicles including bicycles +6.2%, sports equipment +2.8%).[21] Higher prices can lift nominal sales while weakening unit demand, so watch price, transactions, and mix separately.
• Digital competition (context). E-commerce was 16.9% of all U.S. retail sales in Q1 2026 (an all-retail figure, not a 459110 estimate).[22] Sporting goods are often standardized and price-transparent, which makes online comparison easy; stores defend on immediate possession, expert advice, product testing, services, and community.

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7. Regulation

For most of what these stores sell, regulation is ordinary retail law — sales tax, Federal Trade Commission (FTC) advertising standards, the Americans with Disabilities Act, labor and wage law, zoning, and privacy. Four areas stand out:

• Firearms and ammunition. Retailers that sell guns must hold a Federal Firearms License (FFL) from the ATF (Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives) and must run buyers through the NICS (National Instant Criminal Background Check System) before a sale, under federal commerce-in-firearms rules (27 CFR Part 478).[23] This is the most heavily regulated corner of the industry, it varies sharply by state, and it carries reputational as well as legal risk — DICK'S chose to pull assault-style rifles (2018) and later firearms from many stores, a business decision as much as a compliance one.
• Product safety. Non-firearm gear — bicycles, helmets, treadmills, and the like — falls under the Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC), which sets standards and can order recalls; retailers must act on unsafe products and report safety risks. Recall exposure on fitness and outdoor equipment is a routine operational risk. Notably, guns and ammunition sit outside CPSC jurisdiction — they are not regulated as ordinary "consumer products."[24]
• Online marketplaces. Retailers that run third-party online marketplaces face the INFORM Consumers Act (enforced by the FTC), which imposes identity-verification and disclosure duties for high-volume sellers — defined as at least 200 transactions and $5,000 in gross revenue over a continuous 12-month period, with added disclosures above $20,000.[25]
• Competition policy. The Department of Justice (DOJ) and FTC 2023 Merger Guidelines treat a post-merger Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) above 1,800 with an increase over 100 points as a structural warning sign.[26] The industry's national HHI of 395.8 (below) is far under that, but antitrust agencies analyze narrower local and product markets, so a low national number does not settle any particular deal.

There is no single "sporting goods regulator." The heavy regulatory load is concentrated in firearms; everything else is standard retail compliance.

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8. Competitive dynamics and consolidation

Federal concentration data (2022 Economic Census) describe an industry that was, on paper, fragmented:

The four largest firms held 34.8% of receipts and the top fifty held 58.4%; the HHI of 395.8 is very low (below the ~1,500 line economists treat as "unconcentrated").[2] That points to a fragmented national market, not a monopoly.

But those numbers are 2022 vintage, and the direction of travel is unmistakably toward consolidation:

• DICK'S acquired Foot Locker (completed Sept 2025), creating a combined ~3,200-location company and pushing decisively into sneakers/athletic footwear.[7][11]
• JD Sports bought Hibbett (2024) and Big 5 went private (2025) — three public competitors gone in roughly 18 months.[13][14]
• Meanwhile mass merchants and Amazon keep taking category share on price and convenience, squeezing mid-market chains from below.

The competitive story is a barbell: scaled winners (DICK'S especially) get bigger and lean into experiential, omnichannel, and private-brand differentiation; broadline discounters and Amazon own the price-driven middle; and niche specialists (a local bike or running shop, Bass Pro/REI for destination outdoor) survive on expertise and community. The squeezed middle — undifferentiated regional big-boxes — is where the failures and buyouts have clustered. Consolidation can add buying power, reach, and digital capability, but it also brings integration and portfolio-rationalization risk.

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9. Risks

• Discretionary-spending cyclicality. When budgets tighten, sporting goods are among the first cuts, and shoppers trade down.
• Amazon/Walmart price pressure. Online and mass-merchant competition caps pricing power and pressures gross margin; differentiation has to come from brands, experience, or service.
• Tariffs and sourcing. Heavy reliance on imported gear and footwear exposes the industry directly to trade policy, freight, and currency swings.[7][8][9]
• Inventory risk. Season- and trend-driven merchandise that doesn't sell becomes markdowns; weather amplifies it, and misjudged buys have sunk operators (Big 5's FY2024 net loss).[14]
• Vendor concentration and disintermediation. Chains lean on a few dominant footwear/apparel brands (notably Nike, ~31% of DICK'S purchases) for product and allocation; a brand's shift toward selling direct-to-consumer (DTC) can hurt the retailer.[7]
• Digital economics. Online reach brings fulfillment, returns, shipping, fraud, and price-matching costs.
• Firearms-specific risk. Legal, regulatory, and reputational exposure unique to gun sales.[23][24]
• Fixed-cost stores. Long, expensive big-box leases and distribution/technology commitments are hard to cut when sales weaken.
• Consolidation execution. For acquirers, integrating large deals (DICK'S + Foot Locker) carries real merger-integration risk.
• Data limitations. Federal data don't report industrywide profit, e-commerce share, same-store sales, inventory, or ownership — so investors must underwrite the individual operator, not the census.

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10. How to invest, and the outlook

Public routes. The focused choices are DICK'S Sporting Goods (DKS) — the scaled, large-cap leader, dividend payer, and consolidator, now the way to own Foot Locker too — and Academy Sports + Outdoors (ASO) — the smaller, value-priced, mostly-Southern challenger. Sportsman's Warehouse (SPWH) offers a small-cap, outdoor/hunting tilt. For sneaker/athletic exposure after the buyouts, JD Sports Fashion (London: JD) is the main listed proxy, though it is a UK-listed global company. Broadline names (Walmart, Costco, Amazon) give incidental exposure but are not sporting-goods bets. Because the companies use different comp definitions, currencies, geographies, and business mixes, compare them on more than revenue: comps vs. transactions and ticket, gross margin after markdowns and freight, inventory turns and aging, e-commerce and fulfillment economics, store productivity and lease load, vendor concentration and private-label penetration, free cash flow, firearms exposure, and — for DKS — Foot Locker integration milestones.

Private routes. Much of the industry is only reachable privately. The Foot Locker, Hibbett, and Big 5 deals show that private equity and strategic buyers actively consolidate this space, and destination players like Bass Pro/Cabela's (family-controlled) and REI (a cooperative you join rather than buy) are simply not available on public markets. Direct ownership of an independent local shop is the ground-floor version of the same industry. Private underwriting turns on customer retention, category expertise, normalized inventory needs, lease obligations, vendor terms, digital capability, and exit alternatives.

Outlook. Demand entered 2026 soft, and recent results were mixed rather than uniform: DICK'S-business comps rose +4.5% in FY2025 while Academy's fell −1.5%, Sportsman's same-store sales rose +1.0%, and JD's group like-for-like fell −2.1% (organic +2.1%).[7][8][9][10] A card-spend panel from Consumer Edge read the category down roughly 9% year over year for the three months ended January 2026, on tariffs, inflation, and middle-income caution — a specific window and methodology, not a company comp.[27] Against that, DICK'S is leaning into the slowdown, guiding FY2026 to comparable-sales growth of 2.5%–4.0% and continuing to roll out experiential formats.[27]

The base case is modest nominal industry growth with uneven margins. Scaled omnichannel leaders should hold advantages in buying, fulfillment, and data, but the low national concentration leaves real room for specialists, independents, and private platforms. The upside is stronger participation, successful product cycles, and better store productivity; the downside is consumer trade-down layered on tariffs, excess inventory, weak weather, brand disintermediation, recalls, or poorly integrated acquisitions. The key question is not whether Americans keep playing sports — it is whether a retailer can convert that participation into profitable, repeat purchases while controlling inventory, occupancy, digital fulfillment, and supplier dependence.

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Sources

1. U.S. Census Bureau, "2022 NAICS Definition: 459110 Sporting Goods Retailers" (illustrative examples and cross-references/exclusions; 2022 revision de-emphasizes sales channel). https://www.census.gov/naics/?details=459110&input=459110&year=2022
2. U.S. Census Bureau, "2022 Economic Census — receipts, firm counts, and concentration ratios (CR4/CR8/CR20/CR50, HHI), NAICS 459110" (Histometrics ingested federal statistics). https://api.census.gov/data/2022/ecnsize/groups/EC2200SIZECONCEN.html
3. U.S. Census Bureau, "County Business Patterns: 2023 — establishments, employment, annual and Q1 payroll, NAICS 459110." https://www.census.gov/data/datasets/2023/econ/cbp/2023-cbp.html
4. U.S. Small Business Administration, "Table of Small Business Size Standards (NAICS 459110 = $26.5 million in receipts)," 2023. https://www.sba.gov/document/support-table-size-standards
5. IBISWorld, "Sporting Goods Stores in the US — Market Size (~$107.6 billion, 2025)," 2025. https://www.ibisworld.com/united-states/market-size/sporting-goods-stores/1079/
6. U.S. Census Bureau, "Nonemployer Statistics" (businesses without paid employees; coverage note for the undercount caveat), 2026. https://www.census.gov/econ/overview/mu0500.html
7. DICK'S Sporting Goods, "Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended January 31, 2026" (net sales $17.215B; DICK'S-business comps +4.5%; 3,195 combined DICK'S + Foot Locker locations; Nike ~31% of merchandise purchases, ~1,500 vendors; occupancy as largest expense after merchandise). https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1089063/000108906326000007/dks-20260131.htm
8. Academy Sports + Outdoors, "Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended January 31, 2026" (net sales $6.053B; 322 stores in 21 states; comps −1.5%; e-commerce 11.7% of merchandise sales; gross margin 34.8%). https://investors.academy.com/
9. Sportsman's Warehouse Holdings, "Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended January 31, 2026" (net sales $1.209B; 147 stores in 32 states; same-store sales +1.0%; e-commerce >20% of sales). https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1132105/000119312526134702/spwh-20260131.htm
10. JD Sports Fashion plc, "Full Year Results 2025/26" (group sales £12.662B; North America £4.779B and 2,519 stores incl. 982 Hibbett; group like-for-like −2.1%, organic +2.1%). https://www.jdplc.com/investor-relations
11. PR Newswire / DICK'S Sporting Goods, "DICK'S Sporting Goods Completes Acquisition of Foot Locker," Sept. 8, 2025. https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/dicks-sporting-goods-completes-acquisition-of-foot-locker-302548690.html
12. Forbes (Pamela Danziger), "Dick's Acquires Foot Locker For $2.4 Billion" (Foot Locker ~$8B FY2024 sales; ~2,400 stores), May 16, 2025. https://www.forbes.com/sites/pamdanziger/2025/05/16/dicks-acquires-foot-locker-for-24-billion-building-share-in-sports-and-sneaker-markets/
13. Retail Insight Network, "JD Sports Fashion acquires Hibbett for $1.1bn (~1,169 Hibbett/City Gear stores; closed July 25, 2024)," 2024. https://www.retail-insight-network.com/news/jd-sports-hibbett-acquisition/
14. WWD, "Big 5 Sporting Goods Goes Private in $112.7 Million Deal (FY2024 net sales $795.5M; net loss $69.1M; 414 stores)," 2025. https://wwd.com/footwear-news/shoe-industry-news/big-5-sporting-goods-mergers-acquisitions-take-private-deal-1237962005/
15. Big 5 Sporting Goods, "Current Report on Form 8-K: Merger Completion (Worldwide Sports Group Holdings; October 2025)," SEC filing, 2025. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1156388/000119312525227537/d54346d8k.htm
16. Wikipedia / Great American Outdoors Group, "Bass Pro Shops (private; acquired Cabela's 2017 for ~$4B; ~195 stores; estimated ~$7B+ revenue)," 2026. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bass_Pro_Shops
17. REI Co-op, "REI Co-op 2024 Impact Report and Financials (net sales $3.53B; 25M+ members; cooperative founded 1938)," May 2025. https://www.rei.com/newsroom
18. L.L.Bean, "Who We Are" (private, family-owned), 2026. https://global.llbean.com/llb/shop/20010458.html
19. Scheels, "About SCHEELS" (privately held, employee-owned), 2026. https://www.scheels.com/about/
20. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, "Aerobic Physical Activity Among Adults Aged 18 and Over: United States, 2024" (47.2%), 2026. https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/products/databriefs/db555.htm
21. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, "Consumer Price Index — June 2026, Table 2" (sporting goods +4.5% YoY; sports vehicles +6.2%; sports equipment +2.8%). https://www.bls.gov/news.release/cpi.t02.htm
22. U.S. Census Bureau, "Quarterly Retail E-Commerce Sales: First Quarter 2026" (e-commerce 16.9% of total retail; all-retail, not NAICS 459110). https://www.census.gov/retail/eCommerce.html
23. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, "Federal Firearms Licenses" and 27 CFR Part 478 (commerce in firearms; FFL; NICS background checks). https://www.atf.gov/firearms/federal-firearms-licenses
24. U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission, "Retailers: Product Safety and Your Responsibilities" and products outside CPSC jurisdiction (firearms/ammunition excluded; gear/bicycles included). https://www.cpsc.gov/Business--Manufacturing/Business-Education/Business-Guidance/Retailers-Product-Safety-and-Your-Responsibilities
25. Federal Trade Commission, "What Third-Party Sellers Need to Know About the INFORM Consumers Act," 2023. https://www.ftc.gov/business-guidance/resources/what-third-party-sellers-need-know-about-inform-consumers-act
26. U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, "Merger Guidelines" (HHI structural thresholds), 2023. https://www.justice.gov/atr/merger-guidelines
27. PR Newswire / Consumer Edge, "Sporting Goods Spending Declines Amid Inflation, Tariffs and Middle-Income Pullback (~9% YoY, three months ended Jan. 2026)," 2026; and DICK'S Sporting Goods FY2026 comparable-sales guidance (2.5%–4.0%) and House of Sport / Field House expansion, company filings, 2026. https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/consumer-edge-reports-sporting-goods-spending-declines-amid-inflation-tariffs-and-middle-income-pullback-302718318.html