Motion Picture and Video Production (U.S.) — NAICS 512110

An investor's primer for a general audience. Core figures come from U.S. federal statistics where available; where a metric does not exist, we say so rather than estimate. Forward-looking statements are framed as judgments, not facts.

1. Overview

NAICS 512110 (the North American Industry Classification System code) covers the businesses that actually make filmed content: feature films, documentaries, television series, streaming originals, unscripted programming, television commercials, and corporate/branded video. It is the "content factory" at the front of the media supply chain — the step before a finished title is distributed, streamed, or shown in a theater.

It is a peculiar business. Almost every product is a one-off prototype with an uncertain payoff, financed like a venture bet, and — for the winners — valuable not for a single release but for the decades-long licensing "annuity" a hit franchise throws off. The central tension for investors is simple: audiences reliably demand video, but individual projects are risky. Economics reward the owners of durable intellectual property (IP) — recognizable characters, franchises, and deep libraries — and squeeze everyone who merely rents or makes content for hire.

Two ways in. Public-market investors have almost no way to buy "pure" motion-picture production. The large producers are divisions inside diversified conglomerates (Disney, Comcast/NBCUniversal, Paramount Skydance, Warner Bros., Sony) or inside technology platforms (Netflix, Amazon, Apple), so a share buys a slice of a much larger enterprise. The near-pure listed play is Lionsgate Studios. Private investors, by contrast, can back production directly — through equity in an independent studio, film-and-TV slate financing, senior production loans, tax-credit lending, or rights libraries — and that is where most non-conglomerate capital actually goes to work.

2. What it is and how it's structured

Scope. Establishments primarily engaged in producing, or producing and distributing, motion pictures, videos, television programs, and television commercials — the scriptwriting, casting, shooting, editing, and creative assembly of a title.[1]

What it explicitly excludes (each sits in an adjacent NAICS code):

• Distribution — acquiring rights and getting finished films to theaters and platforms — is NAICS 512120 (Motion Picture and Video Distribution).[1]
• Motion picture theaters / exhibition — NAICS 512131 and 512132.[1]
• Post-production and teleproduction services — editing, captioning, animation, and visual effects (VFX) houses — NAICS 512191.[1]
• Other motion picture and video industries — film laboratories, stock-footage libraries — NAICS 512199.[1]
• Independent artists, writers, and performers working on their own account, including independent contract producers — NAICS 711510.[1]
• Wedding, special-event, and business-inventory videography — classified under photographic services.[1]

That fragmentation matters: much of what people picture as "Hollywood" — the star talent, the effects houses, the distributors, the streamers, the cinemas — is legally not in this code.

Ownership mix — a barbell. At one end, a handful of vertically integrated majors and tech platforms account for most of the revenue and nearly all of the big-budget output. At the other end sit thousands of tiny, project-based independent producers and single-person "loan-out" companies (the corporate entity an actor, writer, or director contracts through). A single corporate group may span production, distribution, streaming, TV networks, advertising, gaming, and theme parks — so a company's total revenue rarely equals its NAICS 512110 exposure. The federal data confirm the shape: across the broader film-and-TV industry, roughly 93% of businesses employ fewer than 10 people.[6]

3. How big it is

Federal statistics for NAICS 512110 (United States):

Concentration. The largest 4 firms took 49.7% of industry receipts, the top 8 took 66.4%, the top 20 took 71.9%, and the top 50 took 76.3% in 2022.[4] Yet the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI, a standard concentration gauge that runs to 10,000, where anything above 1,500 signals a concentrated market) was only 773.7 — technically "unconcentrated."[4] The reconciliation: a few giants dominate revenue, but the code is numerically swamped by thousands of micro-producers, which drags the index down. This is an oligopoly at the top and a cottage industry at the bottom. Note that the concentration data describe revenue among employer firms — not control of every film, franchise, creator, or distribution outlet.

What the federal data do not tell you. The Census and SBA tables provide no industry-level profit margins, operating profit, cash flow, capital expenditure, production volume, average project budget, project returns, or capacity utilization. Those figures are not estimated here.

The undercount caveat — important for this code. The $87.5 billion / 158,632-employee snapshot materially understates the real economic footprint of making filmed content, for three reasons. First, County Business Patterns and the Economic Census count establishments with paid employees; they omit nonemployer businesses, self-employed producers, and freelancers[2][3] — and a large share of this workforce is gig crew, plus talent paid through loan-out companies counted under NAICS 711510, not as payroll here. Second, the distribution, streaming, effects, and exhibition value all lands in other codes. Third, the biggest producers book their output inside diversified parents classified elsewhere. For scale, the Motion Picture Association (MPA, the majors' trade group) counts the wider U.S. film-and-TV industry at roughly 2.01 million jobs, $202 billion in wages, and more than 162,000 businesses[6] — an order of magnitude above the payroll figure in this single code. Read NAICS 512110 as the core production slice, not the whole industry.

4. The investable universe

There are very few clean public "production" stocks. The table separates the near-pure play from the conglomerate and platform owners whose production arms are buried in larger results. These are exposure vehicles, not pure representations of NAICS 512110. Tickers use the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and the Nasdaq Stock Market (Nasdaq).

Major private operating companies and owners: A24 (independent film/TV production and distribution; reported ~$3.5 billion private valuation)[15]; Blumhouse and Atomic Monster (creator-led genre film/TV)[16]; Imagine Entertainment (Ron Howard and Brian Grazer)[17]; Legendary Entertainment (private film/TV/IP company; Apollo funds hold a substantial investment)[18]; Candle Media (Blackstone-backed platform that owns creator-led businesses including Hello Sunshine)[19]; plus Skydance's legacy and the RedBird/Ellison capital behind Paramount Skydance, and independents such as Plan B, MRC, and hundreds of smaller production companies financed privately or through film funds. Private-company disclosure is far thinner than public reporting, and a private-capital sponsor may own a whole company, a single slate, a library, or only a financing position. If you want exposure to production specifically, Lionsgate is the only listed near-pure option; every other public route dilutes it inside a bigger business.

5. How the money works

Making a film is closer to venture investing than to manufacturing: high fixed cost up front, binary outcomes, and value that — for winners — compounds for years through licensing. The upside depends heavily on who owns the rights.

Two contract structures, two risk profiles.

• Commissioned (cost-plus) production. A streamer, network, advertiser, or studio pays a producer a fee — production cost plus a margin — to deliver a title the buyer then owns outright. Lower risk, predictable, but you forfeit the long-tail library value.
• Owned or co-financed production. The producer funds or shares the cost and keeps the IP, licensing income, and contingent participation. Bigger risk, bigger reward — and the full windowing and library annuity. Much of the industry's tension since the streaming boom is about who bears the risk and who keeps the annuity.

The greenlight and break-even math. A studio commits a production budget plus a marketing spend ("prints and advertising," often 50–100% of the budget again). A common rule of thumb is that a theatrical film must gross roughly 2.5x its production budget worldwide to break even, because the studio keeps only part of ticket sales.[20] Of the box office, the studio (via its distributor) typically keeps ~50–60% domestically, ~40% internationally, and as little as ~25% in China; exhibitors and local distributors take the rest.[20]

Windowing — getting paid several times for one asset. After theaters, a title moves through a sequence of "windows": premium video-on-demand (PVOD, a paid digital rental where the studio can keep up to ~80%), then subscription streaming (subscription video-on-demand, or SVOD), then licensing to pay and linear TV, plus international sales. Universal's PVOD push reportedly generated $1 billion in under three years, adding roughly 30% to theatrical revenue, and the theatrical-to-home window has compressed from ~64 days to as little as ~20.[20] These post-theatrical windows are near-pure margin — the movie already exists, so almost every incremental dollar drops to profit.[21]

Library, licensing, and ancillary rights — the annuity. A deep catalog throws off recurring, low-cost licensing income for years, which is why studios and their libraries change hands for tens of billions. On top of that, successful franchises monetize through merchandise, consumer products, theme-park attractions, games, publishing, and remakes — revenue that can dwarf the box office for family and superhero properties. The modern studio's real objective is durable IP.

Tax credits as a direct budget offset. State and national production incentives (Section 7) hand back a percentage of qualifying spend, effectively lowering the cost of goods on every production; the resulting credits can become receivables that support borrowing.[7] For independents, incentives, pre-sales (selling territory rights before shooting), and slate co-financing are often the difference between a film getting made and not.

A note on accounting. Large studios capitalize production costs and amortize them over expected distribution windows or useful economic lives, so cash spending often occurs well before accounting revenue is recognized, and errors in forecasting audience performance can force accelerated amortization or impairment write-downs.[8][11][14] The most useful operating indicators are content-asset balances and amortization, cash production spend, contracted backlog, library licensing revenue, theatrical and streaming performance, tax-credit receivables, production-loan balances, and project economics after distribution fees, residuals, participations, marketing, and financing.

6. What drives demand

• Streaming content budgets — now the single biggest driver. Platforms need a continuing supply of new programming and recognizable catalog content, and they collectively commission far more production hours than theaters ever did. Netflix alone budgeted ~$18 billion for 2025, roughly half on originals.[14]
• The theatrical box-office cycle. Still the marketing engine and a real revenue source, but structurally smaller: 2025 domestic box office was about $8.6 billion, roughly 24% below 2019's $11.4 billion,[22] on around 780 million admissions versus ~1.23 billion in 2019.[23] Higher ticket prices masked an even steeper drop in attendance. Theatrical success still lifts later licensing, home-entertainment, and streaming value.
• Franchises and premium IP. Established characters and adaptations reduce marketing friction and support sequels, spin-offs, merchandise, and international sales. Demand is lumpy and title-driven — a strong tentpole year lifts the whole chain; a thin slate starves it.
• Advertising and corporate spending. TV commercials and branded/corporate video (both inside this code), plus connected-TV and online video, rise and fall with ad budgets; the Interactive Advertising Bureau (IAB) reports continued structural growth in internet advertising.[30]
• Global markets and local-language content. International audiences and local-language originals are a growth lever, though local regulation and audience preferences vary.
• Production technology / AI. Artificial intelligence (AI) may cut costs in development, localization, VFX, and post-production; whether the savings accrue to producers, distributors, talent, or customers is unresolved.

7. Regulation

Production is lightly regulated as a product (the MPA's film ratings are voluntary self-regulation) but heavily shaped by subsidies, labor rules, and copyright.

• Production incentives are the dominant policy lever. U.S. states compete with refundable or transferable tax credits. California's Film and Television Tax Credit Program 4.0 allocates $750 million per fiscal year over a five-year program[25] — more than doubling its prior $330 million cap and raising the base credit to as high as 35–40%; New York lifted its program to $800 million plus a $100 million independent-film carve-out, and Georgia remains a magnet because its 20% (+10%) credit is uncapped.[24] Investors must verify whether a given credit is refundable, transferable, monetizable, or dependent on future appropriations.[24][25]
• Runaway production and offshoring. Foreign incentives now out-compete most U.S. states: the U.K. offers ~40%, Australia ~40%, Ireland ~32%, and Canada 25% federally (up to ~50% with provincial top-ups).[26] In the most recent year an estimated 45% of U.S. films and scripted TV were shot internationally, up from ~33% in 2022,[27] hollowing out domestic soundstages (Los Angeles County production jobs fell more than 35% between late 2022 and early 2026).[28] In 2025 the administration floated a 100% tariff on movies produced outside the U.S.; most analysts regard a tariff as largely unworkable and the practical debate has shifted toward federal tax incentives (outcome unresolved as of mid-2026).[27]
• Labor. Three unions set the cost base: the Writers Guild of America (WGA), the Screen Actors Guild-American Federation of Television and Radio Artists (SAG-AFTRA), and the International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees (IATSE, crew). Their contracts govern minimums, residuals (ongoing payments when content is reused), and — increasingly — AI protections. The 2023 SAG-AFTRA agreement addressed streaming pay and AI; a successor agreement announced in 2026 was still described by the union as tentative.[33][34]
• Copyright and rights clearance. Every title depends on documented rights to scripts, underlying IP, music, performances, locations, and archival material; the U.S. Copyright Office protects motion pictures as audiovisual works once fixed in a tangible form.[31] The Office is separately examining AI-generated outputs, copyrighted training material, and digital replicas — an unsettled framework that is both a productivity opportunity and a rights risk.[32]
• Antitrust. Mergers may be reviewed across several possible markets, including SVOD, linear TV, and studio development/production/distribution.[35]

8. Competitive dynamics and consolidation

The industry is simultaneously fragmented and concentrated: thousands of small producers compete for commissions, while large integrated groups control valuable IP, distribution relationships, platforms, and marketing. That gives large buyers and rights owners far stronger bargaining power than individual production vendors. Firms compete on creative development and talent access, on cost/speed/execution, on ownership of franchises and libraries, on distribution and marketing reach, and on the financing capacity to absorb misses.

The sector is mid-consolidation, driven by shrinking theatrical economics, expensive streaming, and the scale advantages of tech platforms:

• Paramount + Skydance closed in August 2025, recapitalizing Paramount with Ellison-family and RedBird capital.[10]
• Warner Bros. Discovery put its studio and streaming assets in play. Netflix agreed in January 2026 to buy the studio, HBO, and HBO Max; Paramount Skydance then won a competing bid on Feb 27, 2026, valuing WBD at a ~$110 billion enterprise value and paying Netflix a $2.8 billion break-up fee.[11] The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) Antitrust Division cleared the Paramount Skydance–WBD deal, but a federal judge temporarily paused closing — so it should not be treated as completed (status contested at the time of writing).[35]
• Comcast has separately announced a planned separation of NBCUniversal and Sky, which could change how its content assets are owned and reported.[36]

The strategic logic is that content libraries + distribution + a subscriber base create scale a stand-alone studio can no longer match. The likely end state: fewer, larger integrated players plus a long tail of nimble independents (A24, Blumhouse) that win on creative specialization rather than scale. The streamers rewrote the rules by shifting from licensing others' content to producing their own — turning former customers (Netflix, Amazon, Apple) into the industry's largest producers and buyers at once.

9. Risks

• Hit-or-miss volatility. Every title is a fresh bet; a single flop can consume substantial capital, and a slate of them can erase a year's profit. A deep library and diversification across many productions are the main defense.
• Structural theatrical decline. Attendance sits well below pre-pandemic levels;[22][23] the box office may never fully recover, pressuring the model that historically funded big-budget films.
• Labor disruption. The 2023 WGA and SAG-AFTRA strikes shut down production and are estimated to have cost the U.S. economy more than $5 billion.[29] Contract cycles are a recurring shutdown risk, and AI bargaining keeps the issue live.[33][34]
• Platform bargaining power. Streamers and networks can demand lower prices, broader rights, or fixed-fee (cost-plus) structures that strip producers of library upside.
• Runaway production / policy risk. Continued offshoring erodes the domestic base, and incentive changes — state caps, a federal tariff or credit — can rapidly shift where money is spent.[27][28]
• Generative AI. A double-edged disruptor: it can compress pre- and post-production and slash budgets, but it also threatens jobs (an estimated ~204,000 entertainment roles projected to be disrupted by 2026) and raises unresolved fights over likeness rights, training data, and residuals. Tools such as OpenAI's Sora point toward far cheaper content, pressuring both costs and the scarcity value of professionally produced film.[28]
• Content-accounting risk. Forecast errors can trigger accelerated amortization or impairments, and cash spending routinely precedes revenue recognition.[8][14]
• Rights and chain-of-title failure. Weak title, music disputes, talent claims, or unauthorized AI-generated likenesses can impair or halt a project.
• Tax-credit and financing dependence. A production can become uneconomic if a state cuts, delays, or changes its incentive program;[24] production loans, tax-credit facilities, and corporate debt add interest-rate and refinancing risk.[7]
• Private-market opacity. Private investors may lack audited project-level data, reliable recoupment histories, or clear information about who owns the rights.
• Data limitations. Employer-based federal statistics do not capture the full universe of freelancers, nonemployer businesses, or project entities.[2][3]

10. How to invest and the outlook

Public routes

• Closest pure-play: Lionsgate Studios (LION) is the only listed near-pure motion-picture/TV production company — though even it bundles distribution, library, and talent-management businesses, and it is small and volatile.[7]
• Diversified exposure: Disney, Comcast, Paramount Skydance, Warner Bros. Discovery, and Sony give you production plus parks, cable, networks, gaming, or electronics — production is a minority of each.
• The platform bet: Netflix, Amazon, and Apple are, in practice, the largest content producers, but a share buys the whole tech/retail enterprise, not the studio.
• What to compare: the share of revenue and profit actually tied to studios; content spending and cash flow rather than revenue alone; library durability and licensing renewals; leverage and content-asset impairments; release-slate quality and franchise depth; dependence on a single platform, distributor, or hit; and exposure to pending mergers, separations, and regulatory conditions. There is no clean "production multiple" to trade — reserve valuation judgments for the specific parent you are buying.

Private routes (where most non-conglomerate capital goes)

• Film funds and slate co-financing — pooled equity backing a studio's release slate for a share of returns.
• Senior production loans and tax-credit / gap financing — lower-risk debt against a production's expected incentives and pre-sales.
• Direct equity in independent studios (A24-style) — concentrated, illiquid, but where breakout creative value is captured.
• Library purchases or partnerships and private-equity stakes in production, post-production, or rights-management platforms.
• Key diligence questions: who owns the rights, who controls distribution, how the recoupment waterfall works, which costs are guaranteed, how overruns are funded, whether a completion bond is in place, and what happens if a project is delayed or never released.

Outlook

Forward-looking judgment: demand for filmed entertainment should stay durable, but value will keep migrating away from the individual theatrical release toward scarce IP, deep libraries, repeatable production capability, efficient cost structures, and flexible distribution. Producers with diversified clients and recurring library or licensing income should prove more resilient than single-title ventures, and the strongest opportunities may come from financing disciplined slates and rights owners rather than simply adding production volume. Near-term signals to watch: the resolution of the Warner Bros. takeover contest and whether consolidation leaves 3–4 mega-players;[11][35] whether U.S. federal incentives materialize to counter offshoring;[27] the pace and terms of AI adoption and the next union contract cycle;[28][34] and whether theatrical stabilizes or continues its structural slide.[22] The federal data do not support a precise industry profit or growth forecast, so treat production volume, content spend, rights ownership, backlog, labor terms, tax incentives, and consolidation approvals as the primary forward-looking indicators.

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Sources

1. U.S. Census Bureau. "NAICS 512110 — Motion Picture and Video Production (2022)" (definition, scope, and adjacent-code exclusions). https://www.census.gov/naics/?input=512110&year=2022&details=512110
2. U.S. Census Bureau. "County Business Patterns: 2023" (NAICS 512110 — establishments, employees, annual and Q1 payroll). https://www.census.gov/data/datasets/2023/econ/cbp/2023-cbp.html
3. U.S. Census Bureau. "2022 Economic Census — Summary Statistics (receipts and firms), NAICS 512110." https://data.census.gov/table/ECNBASIC2022.EC2251BASIC
4. U.S. Census Bureau. "2022 Economic Census — Concentration of Largest Firms (CR4/CR8/CR20/CR50, HHI)." https://data.census.gov/table/ECNSIZE2022.EC2200SIZECONCEN
5. U.S. Small Business Administration. "Table of Small Business Size Standards" (2023), NAICS 512110 = $40 million. https://data.sba.gov/dataset/small-business-size-standards
6. Motion Picture Association. "The Economic Contribution of the Motion Picture & Television Industry to the United States" (2.01M jobs, $202B wages, 162,000+ businesses; ~93% employ fewer than 10). https://www.motionpictures.org/research-docs/the-economic-contribution-of-the-motion-picture-television-industry-to-the-united-states/
7. Lionsgate Studios Corp. "Annual Report to Shareholders" (2026), plus StockAnalysis, "Lionsgate Studios (LION) — Market Cap and Revenue." https://stockanalysis.com/stocks/lion/market-cap/
8. The Walt Disney Company. "Form 10-K, fiscal 2025." U.S. SEC. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1744489/000174448925000155/dis-20250927.htm
9. Comcast Corporation. "Form 10-K, 2025" (NBCUniversal Studios segment). U.S. SEC. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1166691/000162828026004994/cmcsa-20251231.htm
10. Paramount Skydance Corporation. "Form 10-K, 2025." U.S. SEC. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/2041610/000204161026000011/psky-20251231.htm
11. Warner Bros. Discovery, Inc. "Form 10-K, 2025" and merger 8-K disclosures (Paramount Skydance bid, ~$110B EV, Netflix termination fee). U.S. SEC. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1437107/000143710726000020/wbd-20251231.htm
12. Sony Group Corporation. "Form 20-F, fiscal year ended March 31, 2026." https://www.sony.com/en/SonyInfo/IR/library/FY2025_20F_PDF.pdf
13. Amazon.com, Inc. "Form 10-K, 2025" (Amazon MGM Studios); TheWrap, on the $8.45B MGM acquisition (2021). https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1018724/000101872426000004/amzn-20251231.htm
14. Netflix, Inc. "Form 10-K, 2025"; Variety, "Netflix Content Spending 2025 'Not Anywhere Near Ceiling'" (~$18B, roughly half originals). https://variety.com/2025/digital/news/netflix-content-spending-2025-ceiling-cfo-1236328510/
15. A24, "About A24"; No Film School, "What Does A24's $3.5 Billion Valuation Mean for Hollywood?" https://nofilmschool.com/a24-valuation-hollywood
16. Blumhouse, "About Blumhouse" (Blumhouse and Atomic Monster). https://www.blumhouse.com/about
17. Imagine Entertainment, "About Imagine." https://imagine-entertainment.com/about/
18. Apollo Global Management, "Legendary Entertainment Announces Investment by Apollo Private Equity Funds" (2022). https://ir.apollo.com/news-events/press-releases/detail/33/legendary-entertainment-announces-760m-investment-by
19. Candle Media, "Team and portfolio overview" (Blackstone-backed; Hello Sunshine). https://candlemedia.com/team/
20. SymphonyAI. "Why studios are reshaping movie releases to optimize transactional revenue" (2.5x break-even, box-office splits, PVOD, windowing). https://www.symphonyai.com/resources/blog/media/studios-movie-transactional-revenue/
21. StatSignificant. "How Movies Make Money After Leaving Theaters: The Economics of a Film on Streaming." https://www.statsignificant.com/p/how-movies-make-money-after-leaving
22. Axios. "What box office numbers for 2025 tell us about the state of movie theaters" (~$8.6B; price vs. attendance). https://www.axios.com/2026/01/02/domestic-box-office-2025-movie-theaters
23. Deadline. "Box Office: 2025 Admissions at 780M, -5% From 2024." https://deadline.com/2026/01/box-office-2025-admissions-1236660208/
24. GreenSlate. "State-By-State Film & TV Production Tax Credit Updates" (CA, NY $800M+$100M, GA uncapped). https://greenslate.com/blog/state-by-state-film-tv-production-tax-credit-updates
25. California Film Commission. "Film and Television Tax Credit Program 4.0: The Basics" ($750M/yr, five-year program). https://cdn.film.ca.gov/tax-credit/the-basics-4-0/
26. Entertainment Partners. "Hollywood offshoring: who's winning the global production race" (UK/Australia/Ireland/Canada credits). https://www.ep.com/news/2026-hollywood-offshoring-look-at-whos-winning-global-production-race/
27. CNBC. "Why movie production has moved out of the U.S. — and what a tariff could mean for Hollywood" (~45% shot abroad; 100% tariff proposal). https://www.cnbc.com/2025/09/29/trump-movie-tariffs-why-production-has-left-hollywood.html
28. Duke Tech Policy (Sanford). "AI & the Film Industry: Production" (LA County production jobs down 35%+; ~204,000 roles), with Brookings, "How OpenAI's Sora hurts the creative industries." https://techpolicy.sanford.duke.edu/blog/ai-the-film-industry-production/; https://www.brookings.edu/articles/how-openais-sora-hurts-the-creative-industries/
29. Camoin Associates. "The Economic Impact of the Hollywood Writers and Actors Strikes" (>$5B). https://camoinassociates.com/resources/economic-impact-of-the-hollywood-writers-and-actors-strikes/
30. Interactive Advertising Bureau. "Internet Advertising Revenue Report: Full Year 2025." https://www.iab.com/insights/internet-advertising-revenue-report-full-year-2025/
31. U.S. Copyright Office. "Motion Pictures: Registration." https://www.copyright.gov/registration/motion-pictures/
32. U.S. Copyright Office. "Copyright and Artificial Intelligence." https://www.copyright.gov/ai/
33. SAG-AFTRA. "2023 TV/Theatrical Contracts." https://www.sagaftra.org/contracts-industry-resources/contracts/2023-tvtheatrical-contracts
34. SAG-AFTRA. "2026 TV/Theatrical Contracts" (announced tentative). https://www.sagaftra.org/contracts-industry-resources/contracts/2026-tvtheatrical-contracts
35. U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, statement closing its investigation of the Paramount Skydance–Warner Bros. merger, with Associated Press, "Judge pauses Paramount Skydance–Warner Bros. merger." https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/statement-department-justice-antitrust-division-closing-its-investigation-merger-paramount; https://apnews.com/article/361fa669019e0053cf6d4513e6e275e3
36. Comcast Corporation. "Exhibit announcing planned NBCUniversal and Sky separation." U.S. SEC. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1166691/000095010326009591/dp249094_ex9901.htm